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May 2003
Making Sense Out of Insurance, Condemnation, and Settlement Clauses in Deeds of
Trust
Roger Bernhardt
Introduction
I predict that two consequences will flow from the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Kasdan,
Simonds, McIntyre, Epstein & Martin v World Sav. & Loan Ass’n (In re Emery) (9th Cir 2003)
317 F3d 1064, reported at p 168, holding that moneys received by trustors in settlement of their
damage claims against their contractor need not be turned over to their lender. First, no other
court is likely to agree with the logic announced by the court. Second, all lenders will rewrite
their deed of trust forms to completely escape that reasoning—and its consequences—anyway.
To a large degree, therefore, this commentary may be an exercise in futility, although I will try to
redeem it by some broader observations at the end.
(For those of you who have not yet read the case summary, what happened is that a law firm
settled with their clients’ contractor over construction defects, paid $335,000 of the funds
received over to the clients, and retained $200,000 for their fees. The clients, trustors under a
deed of trust, pocketed the money, defaulted on their loan, and filed bankruptcy. The lender got
the stay lifted, foreclosed, underbid, and then went after the law firm for converting money that it
said belonged to it. The bankruptcy court held for the law firm, the district court held for the
lender, and the Ninth Circuit ultimately held for the law firm, on the ground that no funds
belonging to the lender had been converted.)
Was Anything Owed?
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in concluding that none of the settlement belonged to the
lender is so unusual that it forms the basis of my first opinion that other courts are unlikely to
agree. The deed of trust provision covering funds arising from any action against third parties
“for injury or damages to the Property . . . and which arose or will arise before or after the date of
this Security Instrument” clearly included this settlement, and nobody seemed to contend
otherwise on that issue. But the fact that the funds were assigned to be applied to “any amount
that I may owe to Lender under the Note and this Security Instrument” is what killed the lender.
Since other provisions in the document refer to “sums secured,” the court declared that the
amount owed was “zero,” so long as the trustors were not currently in default on their payments.
(I must observe with amusement that this same deed of trust, in defining the note, stated: “The
note shows that I owe Lender U.S. $450,000 plus interest” (my italics). I got this and a few other
facts from the underlying file rather than from the opinion itself.)
Well, I wish I could state on my loan applications that I do not “owe” anything on all my
debts, simply because I happen to not be in default on them at that moment. And when I asked
two friends how much they owed on their mortgages, they each replied with the principal
balances on their loans, not the overdue arrearages. A case I have in my casebook on dragnet
clauses says (Langerman v Puritan Dining Room (1913) 21 CA 637, 642, 132 P 617):

A debt, whether legally enforceable at the present time or at some future time, constitutes an
existing obligation, and when we refer to a debt we at once understand thereby that thus there is
resting upon some one an obligation to pay money to another when the time fixed by the parties,
or by law, for its payment has ripened.
I take this to mean that money can be owed long before it is payable. To me, the way the court
uses the word “owe” is not at all what most of us mean when we use it.
Hedging Against Similar Results
But kicking around an opinion just because you think the judges got it wrong is not productive
activity. (Law professors may delight in doing so, but it too readily seduces students into
thinking they can ignore any rule they don’t like.) Even though people may continue to speak
and write the same way as before, it is not impossible for judges to begin limiting “owed” to
“amounts currently due and payable,” despite its common contrary usage, as happened here.
Careless inclusion of that word in a document could become costly.
As a result of this opinion, the obvious change I would expect this lender to make is to revise
its deed of trust provision covering assignment of litigation proceeds to have the money applied
to all “sums secured”—the term that is used in the related insurance and governmental taking
provisions—and to make sure that the definition of that phrase is broad enough to cover all
possibilities. If the lender lost the Emery case because of what its deed of trust said, then saying
it differently should let it win the next one.
I would also suggest that attorneys make a computer scan of all of their documents for the
word “owed” to see if it appears in any dangerous context. (For instance, if interest is to be
charged on all sums owed, do you really want to make the unpaid balance due interest-free?) Too
often, one paragraph of a document is revised in response to some recent adverse ruling without
due consideration of all the companion paragraphs in the instrument.
Don’t Let Consistency Trump Sensitivity
The above advice does not, however, mean that the three paragraphs in a deed of trust
covering insurance, condemnation, and settlement proceeds should be identical in all respects.
Based on past cases, there are different lessons to be learned for each, a few of which I will
mention here in the remaining space allotted to me.
1. Insurance Proceeds. Property insurance proceeds are products of private contracts, so
insurance proceeds paid after a casualty to the trustors’ property do not belong to the lender. The
lender can reach them only if the deed of trust was properly worded. If the particular risk was not
required to be covered—as is true of earthquakes, for example—then a trustor who has
independently elected to insure against that risk can keep the proceeds despite the effect on the
lender’s security. See Ziello v Superior Court (1995) 36 CA4th 321, 42 CR2d 251; Foothill
Village Homeowners Ass’n v Bishop (1999) 68 CA4th 1364, 81 CR2d 195. (However, a back
door route to these funds may exist if the deed of trust assigns all insurance proceeds to the
lender, even for hazards that were not required to be covered. See JEM Enters. v Washington
Mut. Bank (2002) 99 CA4th 638, 121 CR2d 458; Martin v World Sav. & Loan Ass’n (2001) 92
CA4th 803, 112 CR2d 296.)
Emery, of course, advises lenders that such assigned insurance proceeds should not be limited
to being applied to what the trustor then owes. On the other hand, in Schoolcraft v Ross (1978)
81 CA3d 75, 146 CR 57, the judges’ refusal to allow a lender to claim the proceeds when the

trustor wanted to use them to rebuild is probably not a result that better drafting can overrule. But
the permission granted to lenders by CC §2924.7(b) to reach the funds, regardless of any
impairment of security issue, seems to mean that even the amply oversecured lender can take the
entire award without needing a special clause to that effect.
2. Condemnation Awards. Because these awards constitute substitute security, a lender has a
claim to them even when the deed of trust is entirely silent on that issue. But here the doctrine of
impaired security may come into play and limit that claim to only what is necessary to restore the
lender’s previous loan-to-value ratio. See Milstein v Security Pac. Nat’l Bank (1972) 27 CA3d
482, 103 CR 16; People ex rel Dep’t of Transp. v Redwood Baseline (1978) 84 CA3d 662, 149
CR 11. The elimination of the impairment requirement in CC §2924.7 applies only to insurance
awards, and I cannot really say whether good language will let the lender keep the entire award,
even when its loan is quite safe anyway.
3. Litigation Awards and Settlements. This situation got off to a bad start in 1968 when Justice
Traynor held that a deed of trust provision covering damages awarded for injury to property did
not apply to the money received by the trustors in settlement of their fraud claims against their
sellers. American Sav. & Loan Ass’n v Leeds (1968) 68 C2d 611, 68 CR 453. That probably
explains the far broader language used in Emery, as well as why that clause goes on to say that
“injury or damages” includes claims for breach of contract, fraud, concealment, and negligent or
intentional acts. Without this provision, some of those recoveries might qualify as substitute
security, but many would not. And—if impairment of security is a factor—when does the
security become impaired upon the discovery of a previously unknown defect?
Finally, all of this still leaves open the very interesting question that the Ninth Circuit left
unresolved: To what degree must the borrowers’ lawyers take steps to ensure that the security
interests of their clients’ lender remain protected. When is the last time you thought it wise to tell
your homeowner clients that you felt duty bound to notify their bank in order to make sure that
their recovery would be taken away from them by the bank as soon as they got it?
Kasdan, Simonds, McIntyre, Epstein & Martin v World Sav. & Loan Ass’n (In re Emery) (9th Cir
2003) 317 F3d 1064
In 1993, the Emerys refinanced their home through World Savings (World). As security for
the loan, the Emerys executed a deed of trust in favor of World that assigned to World the
Emerys’ rights in any legal cause of action relating to injury or damage to their home. After
refinancing, the Emerys discovered construction defects and litigation ensued. After payment of
attorney fees ($198,686) and costs ($62,250), the Emerys’ net share of the settlement proceeds
totaled $335,272. The Emerys’ attorney (Kasdan) disbursed this amount to them and their
creditors in 1996. Neither the Emerys nor Kasdan notified World of the suit.
The Emerys defaulted on their loan to World and filed for bankruptcy. Although World
foreclosed, it did not recoup the full amount of the Emerys’ indebtedness. World sued Kasdan
for conversion of the settlement proceeds. The bankruptcy court entered summary judgment for
Kasdan and the district court reversed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Kasdan did not convert the settlement proceeds. Even
assuming the provision in the deed of trust for assignment of rights created a property interest
capable of being converted, World did not have an immediate possessory interest in the litigation

proceeds. The deed of trust did not vest World with exclusive rights to the settlement proceeds
but only entitled World to demand the amount that the Emerys “owed” to it. At the time Kasdan
distributed the settlement proceeds, the Emerys were not in default. Because the amount “owed”
to World was therefore zero, Kasdan did not injure World by disbursing settlement funds directly
to the Emerys. The court refused to interpret the deed of trust so that the amount “owed” to
World included the entire outstanding balance of the underlying loan, regardless of the Emerys’
default status, because that would result in an acceleration clause triggered by a recovery by the
borrower of damages for injury to the property.
The court also concluded that Kasdan did not convert World’s cause of action for construction
defects. Even assuming that the chose-in-action was the type of property interest that can be
converted, World did not have an exclusive right to litigate that underlying cause of action. The
deed of trust merely gave World the right, “at its option,” to pursue legal action, but did not
divest the Emerys of their right to pursue legal action if World did not exercise that option. The
Emerys retained the right to litigate, conditional on World’s right to intervene. Although World
was deprived of the opportunity to intervene (because the Emerys failed to alert World about the
underlying litigation), that might support a breach of contract claim against the Emerys, but did
not support World’s conversion claim against Kasdan.

